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Abstract 
 
 
 
This master thesis wishes to explore the labor market in the Brazilian oil and gas industry 
during the peak years of the oil boom, seen from Norwegian multinational companies’ 
(MNC) point of view. The theoretical perspective applied in the analysis is the hierarchical 
market economy (HME) typology, deriving from the varieties of capitalism (VOC) 
framework. In HMEs, the low-skill equilibrium is a prominent feature, in which none of the 
actors involved has incentives to invest in education and vocational training. This case study 
investigates to which extent such equilibrium exists in the Brazilian oil and gas industry.  The 
industry is treated as a deviant case, due to factors like the national oil company Petrobras’ 
efforts to raise the human capital, and the intentions of Brazilian authorities to increase 
Brazilian production rates through local content policies. The thesis finds that the low-skill 
equilibrium does not have a strong presence in the Brazilian oil and gas industry, mainly 
because of the firms’ incentives to hire skilled workers. The industry’s labor market was 
extremely heated during the oil boom, with a huge gap between the supply and demand for 
labor. This resulted in high turnover rates among workers. The thesis cannot however give 
firm conclusions regarding the role of local content policies in this transition. 
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1 Introduction  
 
In 2007, the Brazilian oil industry made headlines. The national oil company, Petrobras, 
announced the discoveries huge oil reserves off the southeast coast. The findings were 
situated in the Pre-salt layer, about 5500 meters under the sea surface (EIA 2014), which 
meant that it would still take a while before the oil companies could overcome the 
technological difficulties involved with extracting oil and gas at such depths. However, this 
concern did not curb the enthusiasm and the Brazilian economy boomed. Many foreign firms 
wanted to participate in the economic euphoria, among them quite a few Norwegian firms. 
The Brazilian oil industry seemed like a good match for the Norwegians, with the next step of 
the oil adventure taking place offshore and demanding sophisticated technology for offshore 
exploration that the firms would be well equipped to deliver, taking into account their 
experience from the North Sea. However, the enthusiasm started to decrease when the 
expected outcomes did not appear. It turned out to be more difficult to extract the oil and gas 
from the Pre-salt layer than expected, and the project’s time horizon expanded. Moreover, 
doing business in Brazil proved to not be an easy game. Norwegian firms have mentioned 
many reasons why doing business in Brazil has been so hard. Among them are the high level 
of bureaucracy, inefficiency, an intricate tax system, and the trouble of acquiring and keeping 
a qualified work force (Aftenposten 2014; NRK 2014). This thesis will revolve around the 
challenges in the Brazilian labor market related to the oil and gas industry. 
 
The labor market will be analyzed in the light of the hierarchical market economy (HME) 
typology. The HME can be found within the varieties of capitalism (VoC) family, and has 
been developed in order to describe Latin American economies. It is based on previous 
typologies from the VoC branch, but argues that the hierarchical structures of society, 
together with a high level of social and economic inequality separate the HME from more 
developed economies (Schneider 2013: 4). In HMEs, one inclination is to sustain a 
fragmented labor market, in which one of the characteristics is the low-skill equilibrium. In 
low-skill equilibriums, “individuals do not invest in skills because firms offer few skilled 
jobs. Firms in turn do not invest in production requiring skilled workers because they do not 
think they can find them in the labor market” (Schneider 2013: 114). This situation can also 
be described as a vicious circle. Once you are settled there it can be quite difficult to break 
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out, but not impossible. In this thesis, I want to investigate whether it is possible to find such 
equilibrium in the Brazilian oil and gas industry. 
  
1.1  Research question 
 
To what extent is there a low-skill equilibrium in the Brazilian oil and gas sector, and how do 
Norwegian companies respond to this situation? 
 
The research question is divided in two parts, and will be explored through the eyes of 
Norwegian multinational companies1 (MNCs) operating in the Brazilian oil and gas sector2. 
The first part of the research question is theoretically guided and related to the HME typology 
and the theory of low-skill equilibriums. This research question will be discussed by 
comparing the theoretical characteristics of low-skill equilibriums against the empirical 
findings in the Brazilian oil and gas industry. The second part of the research question is 
empirically guided and connected to the Norwegian MNCs’ experiences in Brazil. The firm 
is portrayed as the most important actor within the varieties of capitalism framework (Hall 
and Soskice 2001: 6), and will therefore play a central role in this thesis as well. The analysis 
of the Brazilian oil and gas industry will be seen through a “firm’s eye” (Schneider 2013: 21). 
The two research questions will be discussed interchangeably throughout chapter five. 
 
1.2  Choice of case: the Brazilian oil and gas industry 
 
This thesis argues that the Brazilian oil industry deviates from HME characteristics because 
of its central position in the Brazilian industrial policy. Oil and natural gas have long been 
important natural resources for Brazil, and this industry has held a special position within the 
nation. For many decades, the national oil company Petrobras maintained a monopoly of the 
oil exploration and had the opportunity to develop without international competition. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Multinational companies or corporations is defined as companies that have offices and/or factories in at least 
one country other than its home country (Investopedia 2015). 
2 The terms ”oil and gas sector” and “oil and gas industry” will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. I 
will also sometimes shorten the term to just “oil industry/sector”, but the term will always refer to the upstream 
oil and gas industry and all its supply chains, including the maritime sector providing services to the offshore 
industry. 	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monopoly was dissolved in 1997, but Petrobras kept its powerful position within the industry. 
In order to secure the continued growth of the supply chain and surrounding industries, the 
Brazilian authorities implemented a local content (LC) policy. The policy has been expanded 
and fortified gradually since 1997, and demands that a certain percentage of the goods, 
services and work force applied in the oil sector should be of Brazilian origin. This 
percentage varies across the different sub-sectors and concession rounds (Guimarães 2013: 
335). One of the intentions behind the LC policy, in addition to activating the surrounding 
industries, was arguably to boost the human capital. The aim was to induce the oil companies 
and the supply chain to employ a larger share of Brazilian qualified work force. Ideally, the 
increased use of skilled Brazilian labor force would gradually develop the nation’s human 
capital, with the goal of eventually breaking free from the low-skill equilibrium. However, 
reality does not always reflect one’s intentions, and at first sight it might seem like the 
journey towards escaping the low-skill equilibrium will still continue for many years. 
 
This thesis wishes to explore the characteristics of the oil industry’s labor market during the 
oil boom, or up until 2014, and compare them against the low-skill equilibrium. The 
hypothesis is that increased focus on Brazilian human capital through the implementation of 
LC policies will make the Brazilian oil industry deviate from an ideal HME by not showing a 
fully developed low-skill equilibrium. 
 
1.3  Norwegian firms in the Brazilian oil and gas industry  
 
In order to narrow down the scope of the thesis, I chose to focus on the Norwegian MNCs 
operating in Brazil. It is more manageable to obtain an overview of the Norwegian actors 
than trying to map out all the foreign companies. Norwegian firms are also important actors 
in the Brazilian market, with a combined market share of around 11 %. In 2013, Norwegian 
firms in the Brazilian oil and gas sector made 31 billion Norwegian kroner (NOK) in 
revenues. This is a 14 % increase from the year before, and 20 % up from 2011 (Rystad 
Energy 2014). These numbers reveal that Norwegian MNCs in general have experienced a 
large growth, with many new investments in the last few years. The majority of the 
Norwegian firms operating in the Brazilian oil industry are oilfield service companies3. One 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Statoil is the only Norwegian field operator with their activity in the Peregrino field. Statoil has become the 
largest foreign oil producer in Brazil, and only Petrobras is larger (Inventure Management 2014: 33). 
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definition of an oilfield service company is a company that provides oil and gas related goods 
and services to the industry involved in the exploration and production process (upstream 
industry) of oil and gas (Rystad Energy 2014). The oilfield service companies constitute a 
large part of the supply chain in the oil and gas industry. In Brazil, Norwegian MNCs are 
most prominent in the segments regarding drilling and rig equipment, subsea installations and 
offshore supply or transportation (Rystad Energy 2014: 27). Brazil has grown to be one of the 
most important markets for Norwegian oilfield services companies since the offshore 
discoveries in 2007, and is now one of the top-three international markets, along with South 
Korea and Great Britain (Rystad Energy 2014). The Norwegian firms in the Brazilian oil and 
gas sector had a total of 9000 employees by the end of 2013 (Inventure Management 2014: 
5). The term “Norwegian companies” is not given a strict definition here, and is applied to all 
companies that are perceived as of Norwegian origin, even though foreign investors may 
have acquired them, and they no longer operate from Norway. This definition provides the 
thesis with a larger universe, since more companies are applicable4. All of the companies 
interviewed for this thesis are operating out of local subsidiaries in Brazil. 
 
1.4  Outline of the master thesis 
 
Chapter two explains the use of method and research design, and discusses challenges 
regarding validity and reliability. In chapter three, I will give a more thorough review of the 
theories and literature regarding “varieties of capitalism”, and describe the characteristics of 
the low-skill equilibrium. Chapter four introduces the history and current state of the 
Brazilian oil industry, while chapter five analyzes the Brazilian oil industry’s labor market 
and compares it against the HME framework constructed in chapter three. Chapter six gives 
some conclusions regarding the empirical and theoretical results from the analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A more specific definition of Norwegian investors requires that the company should have its operational 
headquarters in Norway and be registered in the Norwegian company registry (Brønnøysundregisteret) 
(Inventure Management 2014: 9).  This definition leaves 37 Norwegian companies operating in the Brazilian oil 
and gas sector, with a total investment of 15 billion USD (Inventure Management 2014: 25).  	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2 Methodology 
 
In this section I will discuss the research methodology I have applied while working on this 
thesis. The research design has a qualitative nature, and I will first describe the advantages 
and challenges of using a case study research design. Thereafter, I give a brief account of the 
data collection and the qualitative interview as a suitable method for gathering information in 
qualitative research designs. 
 
2.1  The case study 
 
The case study is often a favored strategy when the researcher wants to explore a 
phenomenon or an event more closely, and to answer the question of how or why the event 
has taken place. These types of questions usually require more complex answers and in-depth 
research which is hard to do when dealing with a large number of units, and thus the case 
study emerge as the best suited research design (Yin 2003: 1; Gerring 2007: 49). A popular 
definition of a case study is “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that 
study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)” (Gerring 
2007: 20). In this particular instance, the intent is to explore how aspects of the Brazilian oil 
and gas industry function, using a Latin American typology from the varieties of capitalism 
literature. The idea is to compare this industry with the general theory on how capitalism in 
Latin America appears. The study has few aspirations of making generalizations beyond this 
particular industry. External validity, or being able to generalize to a larger and unstudied 
population, is difficult to achieve when doing case studies, since they normally only include a 
small number of cases or subjects. Case studies will therefore not be very representative 
outside of their immediate surroundings (Gerring 2007: 43; Bryman 2004: 273).  The case 
study is however not a preferable research design due to its external validity, but rather 
because of its ability to provide in-depth research. 
 
There are several types and levels of case studies, depending on the degree of theoretical 
purpose or research objective. The case studies range from atheoretical, descriptive studies 
via hypothesis-generating studies and on to theory testing studies based on already existing 
theories (Levy 2008: 4-6). These categories are viewed as ideal types, and one can find case 
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studies with aspects from more than one category. This particular case study includes features 
from both theory-guided studies and theory testing studies. The theory-guided case studies 
aim to interpret the phenomenon in focus by using an established theoretical framework. 
They are often selected “because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in the 
formulation of general theory” (Lijphart 1971: 692). The element of theory-guided study in 
my thesis is that I chose to study the Brazilian oil industry based on an empirical interest in 
the subject. I was later introduced to the theoretical field of varieties of capitalism, and the 
hierarchical market economy (HME) as a typological theory for Latin American economies. 
A typological theory can be defined as  
 
“a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into the 
categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, 
and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, 
but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they 
behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on 
specified dependent variables” (George and Bennett 2005: 235). 
 
The hierarchical market economy can be described as a typological theory since it assumes 
that actors behave a certain way around the Latin American institutions, and the outcomes are 
often represented as results of negative complementarities5. I decided to test this typological 
theory on the Brazilian oil and gas industry through a deviant case study. The reason for this 
choice is that at first sight, some trademarks of this industry seem to differ from the 
generalizations made by the HME. I wanted to explore if these assumptions were correct, and 
what kind of variables that would explain this difference. A deviant case study seemed 
appropriate for this kind of study, since it is a research design that focuses on “observed 
empirical anomalies in existing theoretical propositions, with the aim of explaining why the 
case deviates from theoretical expectations” (Levy 2008: 13). Studying deviant cases that do 
not fit the already established typological theories can also serve to refine the applied theory 
(George and Bennett 2005: 240).  Refining the HME typology is however not the priority of 
this thesis, but it might be possible to draw some recommendations from the conclusion. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 These mechanisms will be explained more carefully in the next chapter. 
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2.2  Data collection 
 
Here I will give a brief account of how I collected the information and data for this thesis, in 
order to increase the transparency around the research process and thus increase the thesis’ 
reliability. The reliability in qualitative studies is measured by “the degree to which a study 
can be replicated” (Bryman 2004: 273), and a replication would not be possible without 
knowing the steps of the research process. I started the process by mapping out the 
Norwegian companies in the Brazilian oil industry defined by the sub-sector they were 
operating in, and the type of employees they used in their operations. The point of departure 
for this work was a list of all the Norwegian companies active in Brazil, provided by the 
Innovation Norway office in Rio de Janeiro. There are about one hundred Norwegian 
companies with a presence in Brazil, and the majority is connected to the oil and gas industry 
(Inventure Management 2014: 11). Based on the web pages of the companies, I made a 
tentative list of all the companies with operative subsidiaries in Brazil, in order to make a 
stratified random sample (Tansey 2007: 768). About two weeks before starting my fieldwork 
in Rio de Janeiro, I sent an e-mail asking for an interview to all the companies where I could 
find online contact information. I received a few answers, and I was able to set up 
appointments to meet them while in Rio de Janeiro. However, the majority of my interviews 
were obtained via the snowball sampling, where my respondents provided me with 
suggestions and contact information of other possible respondents, who I could approach and 
ask for an interview. A danger with this type of sampling is that you might end up with a 
sample of respondents who share many similar characteristics, as respondents tend to 
recommend people with whom they share similar characteristics (Tansey 2007: 770). I have 
avoided this trap somewhat by using the snowball sample from different starting points, and 
thus achieved a relatively widespread sample with representatives from different types of 
companies.  In the end, I feel that I have obtained a fairly good representation of the 
Norwegian companies. I interviewed thirteen companies, in addition to representatives from 
interest organizations and Norwegian authorities6. However, the level of representativeness in 
units used in case studies is always questionable (Gerring 2007: 20), and it is very hard for 
qualitative studies to make wide generalizations. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See appendix A for more details. 
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All the company representatives I have interviewed currently have, or have had, positions in 
the management of the Brazilian subsidiaries. I have chosen not to include any personal 
names in this thesis, only company names, since the companies are the units of interest in this 
research. This way I can provide my respondents with a certain degree of anonymity while at 
the same time not withholding any vital information7. Most of the interviews were conducted 
during my fieldwork in Brazil between February 24 and March 13 2015. Some interviews 
were also conducted in Norway, and via Skype8. I additionally sent e-mail with follow-up 
questions to some of the respondents. All the interviews in person were recorded and 
transcribed. The respondents were presented with a consent form before the recordings 
started, and informed about their rights to withdraw from the interview at any time9. The 
interviews lasted between 15 and 40 minutes, and the majority had a duration of 
approximately 25 minutes. The research project was approved by the	  Data Protection Official 
for Research at the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) prior to the fieldwork, 
and will follow its guidelines concerning the collected data after the project is finished. 
 
The reliability of the research is also influenced by the context in which the research was 
done. It is “impossible to ‘freeze’ a social setting and the circumstances of an initial study to 
make it replicable in the sense of which the term is usually employed” (Bryman 2004: 273); 
it is therefore the researcher’s responsibility to be observant and attentive to the research 
surroundings. While I have been working on this thesis, the Brazilian oil sector has 
experienced a rather turbulent time10. The whole industry is affected by a major corruption 
scandal in the national oil company Petrobras, which has resulted in many of the Petrobras’ 
contracts being put on hold or cancelled while the investigations are ongoing. The key role of 
Petrobras, as the largest oil field operator by far, makes it impossible for many of the oil 
service companies to continue their business as usual, and many companies – including 
Norwegian companies – are forced to economize their operations. The current situation can 
possibly have affected the way the respondents view their own situation, and perhaps made 
them more unsympathetic towards the Brazilian market. This was something I had to keep in 
mind while interviewing Norwegian firm representatives. The current business environment 
might have influenced their answers in more than one way, for instance by downgrading their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The contact information of my respondents can be made available on request. 
8 See appendix A. 
9 Appendix C shows the letter given to the participants. 
10 Read more about the current situation in chapter four.	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own situation within the market and their prospects for the future. Although this is not 
necessarily a problem for the analysis itself, it does undeniably call the reliability of the 
research into question. Doing the interviews as little as a few months earlier could perhaps 
have yielded other answers, and therefore other results, which would be difficult to replicate. 
 
2.3  Qualitative interviews 
 
Qualitative interviewing is usually the preferred method when a researcher wants rich and 
detailed answers from the respondents, while at the same time being interested in the 
respondents’ point of view and how s/he understands issues and phenomenon. This type of 
interview also allows for the emphasis of the research to change during the course of the data 
collection, if important issues should emerge. This way, the interviews will not be limited by 
the interviewer’s preconceived ideas about what is important (Bryman 2004: 320; Berry 
2002: 681). We can separate between two main types of qualitative interviews: the 
unstructured and the semi-structured. In the first one, the interviewer is guided by topic list 
and lets the respondent speak freely, with the possibility of asking follow-up questions about 
topics of special interest mentioned by the respondent. In the semi-structured interviews, the 
researcher has prepared an interview guide with more specific questions that should be 
answered. The respondents can however answer freely, and the interviewer also has the 
possibility to ask more detailed questions if topics of interest should arise (Bryman 2004: 
321). I have used both types during my field research. When interviewing company 
representatives I used an interview guide11 to ensure that all the firms were asked the same 
basic questions. During the interviews, I also asked additional questions when probing for 
more in-depth answers. In interviews with respondents not directly linked to a company, or 
with special knowledge of the Brazilian oil industry, I chose to use the unstructured form. 
This way I let the interviewees speak freely about the topic, while steering them into certain 
topics of special interest during the interview. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See appendix B. 
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3 Theory 
 
The theoretical framework for this case study of the Brazilian oil industry is the varieties of 
capitalism typologies, more specifically the hierarchical market economy (HME). This ideal 
type depicts economic and social structures that are often found in Latin American 
economies, and offer a theoretical context for analyzing labor markets. This context will be 
explored in this chapter, but first I will account for the theoretical debate in which the HME 
can be found. 
 
3.1 Varieties of capitalism 
 
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework was first introduced by Peter Hall and David 
Soskice in 2001, and has since become an acknowledged reference in the literature of 
comparative political economy. In their contribution to the debate they argue against the 
belief that globalization has lead the various economies of the world to converge towards a 
liberal free-market economy. Their claim is that the global tendency has rather been to 
diverge into two different types of market economies, the liberal market economy (LME) and 
the coordinated market economy (CME), which will be discussed further on. These types are 
constructed as ideal types of developed economies and are opposites, or the two “poles of a 
spectrum” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8).  
 
Firms are central actors in the VoC approach to political economy. They are regarded as the 
crucial actors in a capitalist economy, as they are “key agents of adjustment in the face of 
technological change or international competition” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6). But firms 
alone cannot constitute a capitalist economy; they need other actors with whom they can 
interact in order to develop. The relationships they form can be divided into internal relations 
– with their own employees – and external relations, which can be many different actors such 
as clients, stakeholders, trade unions, business associations and governments (ibid.). To make 
these interactions run smoothly, actors depend on several institutions within the market 
economy.  An institution can be defined as “a set of regularized practices with a rule-like 
quality in the sense that the actors expect the practices to be observed and which, in some but 
not all, cases are supported by formal sanctions” (Hall and Thelen 2009: 253). The 
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institutions appear in different sizes, and it is also possible to group together many 
institutions in order to form macro-institutions such as ‘markets’ or ‘vocational training 
systems’.  
 
It is through the interaction between firms and governments that firms can act as ‘key agents 
of adjustment’. On the national level, the government is naturally the most important and 
influential actor. The firms may not be able to create new institutions on their own, however 
they can adjust their own strategies in order to strengthen or weaken the already existing 
institutions. Hall and Thelen describe the institutional adjustments in developed economies as 
a “pas de deux between firms and governments in which each responds to different pressures 
but has to cope with the moves made by the other side” (2009: 260).  
 
The difference between the two types of capitalism presented by Hall and Soskice is based on 
the traits of the institutions within the market economy, and how they interact with each 
other. In LMEs, competitive market arrangements are the main arena in which firms 
coordinate their activities. While in CMEs, the firms focus more on collaborative 
relationships and information exchange inside networks (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8). Another 
difference between the two market economies is the degree of institutional 
complementarities. According to Hall and Soskice, “two institutions can be said to be 
complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency 
of) the other” (2001: 17). For instance, a good and stable vocational training system is likely 
to improve the number of qualified workers available in the labor market. The various 
institutions cooperate differently in the two types of market economy. This means that the 
two types of capitalism will each have their own comparative institutional advantage, which 
is the idea that “the institutional structure of a particular political economy provides firms 
with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 
37). According to this theory, each economy will offer a situation, or an institutional 
advantage, in which the firms can choose to initiate operations or not, depending on whether 
they view the situation as profitable. These institutional advantages can appear in various 
shapes, from providing excellent infrastructure, to providing a skilled labor force. 
 
This thesis will focus on institutions that provide vocational training and education, and the 
labor market. Firms need to relate to these institutions in order to secure a workforce with 
suitable skills, while workers need to decide what skills to invest in, in order to obtain a job 
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(Hall and Soskice 2001: 7). The actors relate to the institutions in a distinctive manner, 
depending on what kind of market economy they are operating in. For instance, in liberal 
market economies, a distinct feature is high fluidity in the labor markets. This volatility gives 
firms little incentive to invest in vocational training to obtain industry-specific skills, as they 
have no guarantees that other firms will not poach their workers afterwards. The vocational 
training is therefore normally provided by institutions that offer an education based on 
general skills. The firms are generally not interested in supporting the public educational 
system, and the individual worker normally provides for its own education. This makes the 
workers more focused on obtaining general skills, so they can be suitable for working in 
many different firms and thus more coveted in the labor market (Hall and Soskice 2001: 30). 
The LME system is normally found in English-speaking countries, with USA and UK as 
clear examples. On the other hand, the coordinated market economy is more directed towards 
educational systems that provide workers with industry-specific skills. In addition, whereas 
an LME is more focused towards individualism in the labor market, a CME puts more 
emphasis on collectivity. Trade unions are typically strong and able to supervise a publicly 
subsidized training system, which firms contribute to indirectly by paying taxes. The unions 
encourage firms to take on apprentices and negotiate this training to ensure that the needs of 
the firm are met and that there is also an external demand for this skill in case the graduates 
should not be employed after their training. This system gives workers more incentive to 
obtain specific skills (Hall and Soskice 2001: 25; Hall and Gingerich 2009). The CME is 
often used to describe northern European countries, with Germany as the clearest example. 
 
3.2 Objections to the varieties of capitalism framework   
 
Hall and Soskice have been criticized for their neo-institutionalist approach, especially from 
the social constructivist branch of political science. Their claim is that trying to map capitalist 
economies based on two ideal types is not very fruitful. When the models are staged at a 
macro level, the analysis is bound to somewhat ignore the empirical wealth found at lower 
levels, among various actors and mechanisms. This makes the macro analysis a limiting 
exercise. There are many actors within an economy, and it is not possible to assume that 
everyone acts according to the ideal type they fit into. Rather, social constructivists believe 
that actors will behave pragmatically: experimenting to find the best solution for themselves 
within their institutional and normative context, while at the same time working on how to 
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change this institutional framework in order to maximize their returns (Hancké 2009: 7; 
Colvin and Darbishire 2012). Colin Crouch argues that the VoC literature needs to shift its 
focus from the general assumption that most aspects of an economy can fit into an ideal type, 
and instead analyze single cases with the intention of finding more variation. Crouch 
continues to say that “[e]mpirical cases must be studied, not to determine to which (singular) 
of a number of theoretical types they should each be allocated, but to determine which 
(plural) of these types are to be found within them, in roughly what proportions, and with 
what change over time” (Crouch 2009: 76). To back up this argument, he claims that among 
the economies that Hall and Soskice (2001) originally placed in the CME basket, the majority 
from western continental Europe, only Germany belongs there without too much of an 
empirical stretch. The other economies have been forced to fit into this model. Even 
Germany may not be an ideal match (Crouch 2009: 85). Crouch’s criticism of the VoC 
literature can be summarized as follows: “Despite the claim to be firm-centred, the approach 
has been too concerned with the macro-level picture of whole economies, and the account of 
types has been too closely linked to the polemic between neoliberalism and social 
democracy” (Crouch 2009: 94). Following this argument, the VoC debate may have lost 
some valuable empirical insight when choosing to focus their analysis on the macro level. In 
particular, the importance of the firm as an actor in a market economy has not been 
highlighted sufficiently. The VoC framework tends to assume that the actions of the firms 
will be in response to the institutions they are surrounded by, while disregarding the variety 
that occurs between different firms (Allen 2004: 95). 
 
The VoC framework also tends to overemphasize stability according to its critics. Deeg and 
Jackson (2007: 158) argue that VoC promote positive complementarities between co-existing 
institutions, and the subsequent resistance from the actors to change the institutions because 
they fear loss of efficiency. This situation leads to a dichotomy of stability and change, and 
makes it harder to regard firms as actors that are able to change their surroundings. One 
solution, according to Deeg and Jackson, is to pursue a more dynamic analysis that explores 
the possibility in which institutions are able to change without consequently changing the 
entire institutional framework (2007: 160). 
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3.3  Varieties of capitalism in Latin America: the    
hierarchical market economy 
 
The LME and the CME are typologies well suited for describing advanced economies, but 
they may not possess the same explanatory power when describing developing economies. In 
an effort to develop the VoC literature, Ben Ross Schneider has constructed another typology 
called the hierarchical market economy (HME). The HME is an ideal type used to describe 
the Latin American countries, and especially the larger economies in the region, but can also 
be applied to other middle-income countries such as South Africa, Thailand or Turkey 
(Schneider 2013: 5; Schneider and Soskice 2009: 33). The name refers to the hierarchical 
relations that are frequently found in these economies. On a macro-level they can be seen as 
top-down regulations distributed by the national government, while on a micro-level they 
describe relations within firms, which are often controlled by a strong owner. The firms’ 
employees often lack formal representation and the unions have little influence on these 
hierarchies because so few workers are unionized (Schneider 2013: 8).  The HME also 
separates itself from the CME and LME in terms of comparative institutional advantages. 
While LMEs seem to be especially suited to promote radical innovation and CMEs make 
incremental innovation through constant improvements, HMEs lack these kinds of 
capabilities to innovate owing to generally lower skills and short-term hierarchical labor 
relations. HMEs therefore specialize in commodity production based on natural resources and 
low-complexity manufacturing (Schneider 2013: 29). 
 
The HME consists of four core institutions: a) domestic business groups that are often 
diversified into subsidiaries with few market connections to one another and with hierarchical 
relations to the owner group; b) multinational corporations (MNC), which traditionally have 
held strong positions in Latin America; c) labor markets that are atomized due to short-term 
connections between workers and firms, and weak links between workers and unions; and d) 
low levels of education or vocational skills (Schneider 2013: 10-12). Complementarities can 
occur between these institutions, as they also arise in LMEs and CMEs, but contrary to the 
other typologies, the complementarities in HMEs are often negative. The low-skill 
equilibrium is one of these negative complementarities, and will be discussed further on in 
this chapter. But first, I will give a more thorough introduction to the core institutions. The 
emphasis of the thesis is the connection between the MNCs and the domestic labor market, 
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and my informants are all representatives of the point of view of MNCs. I will therefore focus 
on describing the complementarities that appear between the MNCs, the low levels of 
education and the labor market, and have chosen to exclude the domestic business groups.  
 
Multinational corporations 
 
MNCs have increased their presence in the Latin American economy since the late 1980’s, 
when they were attracted to the region by macro-economic policies such as privatization, 
deregulation, trade liberalization, and the possibility to invest in agriculture and the industry 
related to the extraction of natural resources (Chudnovsky and López 2007: 12). They are 
described as being central economic protagonists since the mid 1990’s (Schneider 2013: 76; 
ECLAC 2014: 19). While MNCs have been present in Latin America for many years, the 
debate about whether they contribute to economic and social development in the host country 
is ongoing. Studies have found that the effects of foreign direct investments (FDI) on growth 
and investment in the manufacturing sector are generally positive, while the same effects are 
negative in the natural resource sector (Schneider 2013: 80). Chudnovsky and López (2007: 
12-13) highlight three ways in which FDI hypothetically can bring positive spillover effects 
to the host country’s market: (i) when subsidiaries of MNCs introduce new technology and 
bring skilled workers that may go on to work for domestic firms, thus increasing the human 
capital, (ii) the entry of a new MNC in the domestic market can increase competition and 
productivity of local firms, also known as horizontal spillovers, and (iii) MNC subsidiaries 
can urge local suppliers to improve the quality of their products, and at the same time show 
them how to be more effective, creating vertical spillovers. The expected results do not 
always occur, however, as MNCs often do not transfer much of their own technology. There 
is also very little research and development undertaken in Latin America, in fact less than 1 
% of the FDI between 2003 and 2009 were related to research and development (R&D) 
projects (Schneider 2013: 84). MNCs can have positive effects on the level of education in 
the host country. A study shows that blue-collar workers in MNCs had an average of 9 years 
of schooling, while their counterparts in national firms had 7 years. The average tenure was 
also higher within MNCs, and the workers there earned 2,5 times more than workers in 
national firms (Schneider 2013: 85). But MNCs do not seem to increase the incentives for 
investing in human capital, as they do not hire a sufficient number of workers to make a 
difference. In addition, when workers are hired, they are often poached from local firms 
(ibid). Examples of negative spillovers are domestic firms being forced to reduce their 
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production because they cannot compete with the MNCs, and when more productive foreign 
suppliers replace the domestic suppliers and force them out of the market. Natural resource-
intensive sectors, and especially the mining and hydrocarbon industries, are labeled as 
particularly bad at producing positive spillovers, as their ability to create jobs is extremely 
limited (ECLAC 2014: 105).  
 
Atomized labor market 
 
Labor markets in HMEs share some features that distinguish them from other types of 
economies. One of Latin America’s most distinctive feature is the large segment of informal 
employment, to which about 40 to 50 percent of the working population belongs (Schneider 
and Karcher 2010: 631; Berg 2010: 7). The formal employment segment can be divided in 
two: a large group of workers with low skills, no unions and high turnover, and a smaller 
group of workers with high skills, long job tenure and union representation. The former 
group constitutes about 30 to 40 percent of the working population, while the latter accounts 
for the remaining 10 to 20 percent (Schneider 2013: 92). Labor unions in Latin America are 
small, compared to their European counterparts. They have less autonomous organizational 
strength, and rely more on state and party leaders (Schneider 2013: 95). Another feature is the 
job tenure, which is decidedly shorter in HMEs than in CMEs or even LMEs. The turnover is 
high, and a situation where workers change jobs more frequently has negative effects on the 
skill level and labor market regulations (Schneider and Karcher 2010: 630). The unsecure job 
situation influences workers’ incentives to invest in specific skills, as they are not guaranteed 
- or accustomed to - keeping their jobs over a longer time period (Schneider 2013: 104).  
Studies have shown that Brazil is one of the countries with the highest job turnover rate, with 
30 % of the formal workers staying in their job for less than a year. Workers with the highest 
education tend to have a higher tenure than workers with basic education (Gonzaga et.al. 
2003: 179).  
 
These features create a situation where the firms have a lot of power, and the workers change 
jobs often and therefore will have little incentive to specialize on a specific skill. The labor 
markets in HMEs can resemble those in the LMEs to a certain extent, but the workers in 
HMEs lack the legal protection and market leverage of workers in LMEs, and the share of 
informality is larger. HMEs also lack the technological capabilities and innovation ratio that 
one can find in LMEs (Schneider 2013: 99). 
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Education and vocational training  
 
The education levels have historically been low in Latin America, and the average years of 
education is distinctly lower compared to Europe and the Asian emerging economies 
(Schneider 2013: 116; Aedo and Walker 2012: 6). Besides low levels of education in general, 
the Latin American economies have also been struggling with declining returns to education. 
This problem even continued into the 2000’s when there was overall economic growth. Some 
explaining factors are low-quality training and that the students’ skills do not meet market 
demands. Another explanation can be that the business demand for skills is not aligned with 
the skills supply. But no matter how these declining returns on education are explained, they 
still make it less profitable for students to take more education (2013: 124). Brazil is among 
the countries where firms have reported problems with the skills and education of available 
workers being a serious constraint on growth (Schneider 2013: 131; Aedo and Walker 2012: 
110). However, The firms have not been pushing for educational reform, and there are 
several explanations as to why that is. One is that efforts made improving educational 
policies do not yield positive results over a short-term period, and it can prove difficult for 
the firms to commit for longer periods of time. Another explanation is that the low levels of 
skills and education are not entirely a disadvantage to the firms. There are many sectors 
where higher education is not a necessity to the firms, but rather an inconvenience since they 
would have to pay higher wages (Schneider 2013: 131). 
 
3.4  The low-skill equilibrium 
 
The core institutions described above are all connected to one another, and these connections 
yield various effects, or complementarities. The low-skill equilibrium is one of them, and will 
be the focal point for this thesis. In labor markets, one can find two kinds of equilibriums, 
one at a high skill level, and the other at a low skill level. As mentioned in the introduction, a 
simple explanation of the low-skill equilibrium is that “individuals do not invest in skills 
because firms offer few skilled jobs. Firms in turn do not invest in production requiring 
skilled workers because they do not think they can find them in the labor market” (Schneider 
2013: 114). In this situation, which is also referred to as a low-skill, bad-job trap (Snower 
1996: 111), both parties will have few incentives to move out of the equilibrium. Schneider 
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argues that in HMEs the low-skill equilibrium is maintained through complementarities 
between the core institutions (2013: 34). I will base my analysis on three of these 
complementarities:  
 
1. The educational system does not provide enough skilled workers, and this is 
encouraging the MNCs to invest in lower-technology production. 
 
Latin American economies are in general affected by a low level of education, and have a 
tendency to specialize in lower technology commodity sectors, with very small investments 
in R&D (de Ferranti et.al. 2003). This means the foreign MNCs who choose to establish 
themselves in these economies will normally not have many incentives to start production 
demanding higher technology. And when there is an absence of a highly skilled labor force, 
the MNCs will have even fever incentives to change the production pattern of the HME. 
 
2. The atomized labor relations and high turnover among workers prevents investments 
in training. 
 
The atomized labor relations that can be found in HMEs can have various effects on the labor 
market. In my analysis, I will focus on how these relations affect the firms’ incentives to 
invest in their workers education and training. The overall high turnover rate can make the 
firms reconsider their training programs, as they may not want to spend too much time and 
money on their work force, in case the workers leave the firm after a short time period. 
 
3. The MNCs have few incentives to hire highly skilled workers locally, or invest in 
training and education. 
 
The HME is a typology developed to describe developing countries. These countries 
normally do not have a large segment of R&D or technological capabilities. Because of the 
increasing level of economic globalization, the main trend is arguably that MNCs produce the 
R&D in countries with high technological capabilities while the actual production takes place 
in countries with a lower salary level. For HMEs this means that they are likely to be stuck in 
the vicious circle of the low-skill equilibrium when MNCs make investments that do not need 
a high-qualified work force. On the other hand, the MNCs will have few incentives to move 
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their R&D to countries that do not have the academic infrastructure to provide them with the 
necessary work force.  
 
The HME is portrayed as a typological theory, or an ideal type, that reflects a traditional view 
of the Latin American economies as developing countries that specialize in low-technology 
production and where the low-skill equilibrium functions as a vicious circle that prevents the 
economies from developing their human capital. The low-skill equilibrium also brings a static 
quality to the typology, and predicts that these structures are hard to break away from. Yet, 
the reality of HME countries cannot be as simple as their theoretical framework, and the 
general theory may not be able to account for all the sectors of an economy in the same 
manner.  Andrew Schrank (2009: 58) argues that the left-wing parties that have risen to 
power in Latin America over the last decade are promoting change, which consequently 
weakens the explanatory power of the VoC-framework and the HME. Brazil is one of the 
main examples of this wave. In Brazil, the Workers’ Party (PT) has been in power since Luiz 
Inázio Lula da Silva won the election and took presidential office in 2003. Since then, they 
have actively used the oil and gas industry to build industrial infrastructure and promote 
human capital. This process is described in the next chapter, where the local content policy is 
highlighted as an important part of the new industrial policy. When the LC policy is complied 
with, more goods and services are produced in Brazil, by Brazilian workers. One expected 
effect of this policy is that the dynamics of the low-skill equilibrium will change, as the 
MNCs have to change their production structure in order to follow the LC requirements. My 
hypothesis is therefore that the local content policy implemented in the Brazilian oil industry 
will change the dynamics and mechanisms that traditionally are found in HMEs. In chapter 
five, I will investigate this further by comparing the three mechanisms of the low-skill 
equilibrium against findings from the Brazilian oil industry. 
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4 An introduction to the Brazilian oil 
industry 
 
When talking about the Brazilian oil industry, it is impossible not to include the national oil 
company Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras. Petrobras is represented in more or less every 
aspect of the oil industry, and has grown to become Brazil’s largest company. This is the 
result of a political idea that started in the 1930’s: that the oil should belong to Brazil, and be 
used as an instrument to encourage growth in other industrial sectors as well, with the state as 
an active part in the development strategy. In this chapter, I will give a brief account of the 
Brazilian oil history, from the formation of Petrobras up until today.  
 
4.1  Early industrialization  – O Petróleo é Nosso! 
 
“Energy is the motor of development and it is the heart of the national 
organism and therefore should be Brazilian. No one lives with a borrowed 
heart” (General Arthur Levy, cited in Randall 1993: 10). 
 
Petrobras was created in 1953, along with the introduction of state monopoly in the oil sector 
(Schutte 2013: 55), as a result of many years’ debate concerning how the growing oil 
industry should be structured. The Brazilian Constitution of 1934 had concluded that all of 
the subsoil wealth in Brazilian territory belonged to the republic, and the government had 
exclusive power to authorize the search and development of natural resources. The 
government recognized energy security as a strategically important issue for the national 
development, and in order to gain more control over these resources, the National Petroleum 
Council (CNP) was created in 1938. The CNP had, however, a small budget, and was not 
able to start large exploration projects or construct many refineries for the oil production. 
During the 1940’s, the main debate was whether to improve the oil industry by giving room 
to private investments, or implement a state monopoly in order to secure the resources and 
maintain national security, also known as the O Petróleo é nosso (the oil is ours) campaign 
(Randall 1993: 9). Getúlio Vargas was elected president in 1950, with a political platform 
that incorporated a state oil monopoly, and he implemented the monopoly by law in October 
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1953, creating Petrobras at the same time. In the following years, the Brazilian oil industry 
developed slowly, but gradually. The oil production increased steadily from 1954 with the 
goal of finding domestic oil resources and eventually become self-sufficient. Another goal 
was to develop the downstream activity and thus be able to refine the crude oil found on 
Brazilian soil. The downstream segment was just as important as the exploration phase, given 
that replacing the importation of refined oil products is a lot more beneficial to the foreign 
exchange than replacing the imports of crude oil. An important part of the development 
strategy was therefore to establish refineries and a petrochemical industry (Randall 1993: 15). 
In order to continue growing while developing such industries, Petrobras received financial 
incentives such as tax reliefs on the equipment needed for their projects, and exemption of 
import duties and royalties (de Oliveira 2012: 523). While Petrobras strived to achieve 
energy independence, the government handed out subsidies to roads, electricity and diesel in 
order to encourage development. These subsidies led to a larger demand for crude oil, and 
Brazil continued to be dependent on foreign oil, though the domestic oil production made 
them less vulnerable against the increasing international oil prices (Randall 1993: 13-15).  
 
Laura Randall claims that Brazil was not sufficiently prepared for a development project as 
big as Petrobras. Brazil lacked the political stability required for such a project, and Petrobras 
was turned into a pawn in political campaigns. Brazil had also fallen behind in the 
educational sector by not investing enough in primary education; only 50 % of the population 
was literate in 1950. The lack of people knowing how to operate and maintain production 
equipment led to inadequate productivity and competitiveness in the world market. Since the 
state was unable to provide enough skilled labor, Petrobras had to train its own work force 
(1993: 16). The workers entered the company by either passing an exam, or by knowing 
someone in the government or Petrobras administration. The top managers were usually of 
military background, and implemented a disciplined culture in the company (de Oliveira 
2012: 522). Most of the workers attended training courses organized by Petrobras in the 
fields where Brazilian universities did not provide the proper education. Courses in oil 
geology did not exist in the universities at all, leaving Petrobras with the option of hiring 
foreign professors and providing the education themselves. The company also sent students 
to study abroad, who would later return to teach in Brazil. Petrobras saw the need to create 
courses to strengthen graduates from other university programs as well, and it almost reached 
the point where they “were afraid that Petrobras would become a university” (Randall 1993: 
191). Petrobras was investing in research and technology through their research center 
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Cenpes, which opened in 1963. Cenpes started doing its own technological research based on 
basic engineering in 1976, and would also provide detail engineering to refineries and the 
petrochemical industry. The basic engineering group started to develop offshore equipment in 
1983, and the research activities towards increasing the technological capacity in deep-water 
production systems would expand rapidly in the following years. In addition to developing 
technological capacities, Cenpes was also in charge of the technical training for Petrobras 
from 1984, and the number of professional level employees within the research center was 
increasing steadily through the 1980’s (Randall 1993: 245-248). Even though qualifying 
geologists, geophysics and engineers was emphasized, Petrobras would also participate in the 
national service for industrial training (SENAI), which had been established in 1942 (Senai 
2014), by providing internship opportunities for the students in these programs.  
 
The tendency of training your own workers was not just related to Petrobras and the oil 
industry, many business firms often spent large sums of money to equip their workers with 
the educational level they should have graduated with as a consequence of the low 
educational standards. The quality of public education deteriorated during the 1980’s as a 
result of the lack of a public policy regarding secondary education. The students who could 
afford it chose private education alternatives, while others entered the labor market before 
finishing high school (Skidmore 2010: 192; Arriagada and Ziderman 1992: 5).  
 
4.2  Increasing the offshore activity 
 
The 1973 oil crisis hit Brazil hard. Prices escalated, and crude oil imports increased up to 80 
% of the domestic consumption (de Oliveira 2012: 527). Around the same time, Petrobras 
intensified its search for oil fields and started looking for potential offshore fields. In 1974, 
two fields were discovered in the Campos basin. However, Petrobras did not have the 
technological capability to extract offshore oil at that time, so the military regime announced 
that Petrobras would be signing service contracts with international oil companies (IOC). 
These contracts allowed IOCs to explore and develop Brazil’s offshore fields while bearing 
the risks. The IOCs would share the revenue if they should find oil and gas, but would not 
receive compensation if the search were unsuccessful. Petrobras would be the sole operator 
of any oil field found (de Oliveira 2012: 528; Schutte 2013: 55). Petrobras gradually started 
to build up enough technological and practical knowledge to be able to perform offshore 
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activities, and introduced several technological innovations needed to discover reservoirs in 
increasingly deeper waters. This way, the Campos basin “became a gigantic innovation 
laboratory for offshore oil production” (de Oliveira 2012: 531). The stepwise approach to oil 
exploration may also have been an aiding factor in avoiding the resource curse that has 
plagued many petroleum nations. Sarah Brooks and Marcus Kurtz claim that “natural 
resource abundance may not necessarily be a curse when states possess both the human 
capital and industrial capability to discover and produce the ‘hard to get’ oil, such as that 
which lies in the deep offshore waters of Brazil” (2014: 31). This way, the unavailability of 
the Brazilian deep-water oil would allow the country and the national oil company Petrobras 
to develop gradually while improving their technology and human resources along with the 
oil exploration at sea.  
 
The increased offshore activities also demanded a work force equipped to handle the new 
work environments. The merchant marine education has existed in Brazil since 1892. 
However, during the military regime, the Brazilian Navy obtained control over this 
education, and constructed the CIAGA academy in Rio de Janeiro and the CIABA academy 
in Belém in response to the increasing number of ships along the Brazilian coast and the new 
demand of naval officers and seafarers. The centers were completed in 1973, and are the only 
two maritime academies in Brazil today. The Navy still has a monopoly on this education 
(Ciaga 2015; Ciaba 2015). 
 
4.3  Liberalization and growth in the oil industry 
 
The next big transition for the Brazilian oil and gas industry took place in the last part of the 
1990’s. Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed presidential power in 1995, and started 
reforming the country’s economic situation, which had worsened during the 1980’s and 
1990’s. As a measure to improve the economic efficiency, Petrobras was partially privatized 
and the oil market was liberalized, with the goals of attracting foreign investment, reducing 
the subsidies residing in the oil market, and intensifying the oil activities in order to obtain 
self-sufficiency (Amann 2002: 878; de Oliveira 2012: 535; Bjørnstad 2000: 69). The 
Petroleum Law was implemented in 1997 to regulate the oil market, closely followed by the 
creation of the National Petroleum Agency (Agência Nacional do Petróleo – ANP). The oil 
industry regulation was a measure to protect the economy in the transition from a Petrobras 
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monopoly to a free market (Barbosa da Silva and Ventura Lucena 2011). The concession 
round system was also introduced in 1997, under the surveillance of ANP, with annual 
licensing rounds and the first auction taking place in 1999. Here, the oil companies would bid 
for exploration rights in the oil fields displayed in each round. At that time oil prices were 
low, and the production costs in Brazil were considered to be relatively high. The Petroleum 
Law opened up for private investments, stating that the companies would take the risk and 
expenses during the exploration phase, but would also own the oil and gas found if they 
succeeded (Schutte 2013: 56). Petrobras has fared well through this transition, a study by 
Bridgman, Gomes and Teixeira shows that the total factor productivity doubled in the years 
between 1995 and 2000 (2011: 1375). They explain this increase as a cause of the oil market 
liberalization: being exposed to competition has had a major effect on the productivity rate. 
Petrobras has also had the opportunity to develop a world-class capability in offshore drilling 
over the years through extended government support, and by being a central piece in the 
Brazilian industrial policy (Amann 2002: 886). 
 
In October 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from the Workers’ Party (PT) was elected 
president, and held the position for two four-year periods. The economic policy shifted 
during his presidency, with the aim of constructing a new development model. This model is 
often termed “state-led developmentalism”, or “new-developmentalism”. The model can be 
defined as a strategy that emphasizes the central role of the State, and a development strategy 
focusing on: promoting the dynamics of the internal market by increased mass consumption 
and reducing social inequality; creating investment opportunities while still upholding 
industrial policies such as the local content requirements; the promotion of internal savings 
and the prevention of excessive currency appreciation in order to diminish external 
vulnerability; integration with international markets while still defending the domestic 
industry against unfair trade practices; promoting a medium or long term national 
development strategy (Schutte 2013: 54-55; Bresser-Pereira 2011). Industrialization was an 
essential part of the development strategy to increase productivity and innovation. Most 
relevant for this thesis, is the part about creating investment opportunities while at the same 
time maintaining a domestic industry through local content policies, a balance that can be 
quite difficult to uphold. 
 
In Lula’s first year of presidency, the Program for the Mobilization of the National Oil and 
Natural Gas Industry (Prominp) was created with the intention of increasing local content in 
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the oil industry on a competitive and sustainable basis. Prominp is a coordination forum 
where the government works together with Petrobras and industry associations to develop 
projects and policy design in order to “match the demand of the growing oil industry in 
Brazil with the capacity of local firms to supply industrial goods, services and skilled 
workers” (Almeida et.al 2014: 18-19). Lula campaigned on using Petrobras and the oil sector 
as a central tool in the industrial development of Brazil through the implementation of local 
content policies. The idea was to revitalize other parts of the industry by using them as 
suppliers for the growing oil industry. The oil and gas sector is still a vital part of Brazil’s 
development strategy. Data from BNDES, Brazil’s development bank, show that 61,5 % of 
their planned industrial investments between 2011 and 2014 is connected to the exploration, 
production and refining of oil and gas (Schutte 2013: 61; Piquet and Terra 2011: 33). An 
example of the oil industry promoting the growth of other national industries is the Brazilian 
shipyard industry, which used to be the second largest in the world before it collapsed in the 
1980’s. Petrobras launched the Promef program via its subsidiary Transpetro in 2004, with 
the objective of building new ships and oil platforms with at least 65 % local content in order 
to reactivate the shipyard industries (Almeida et.al 2014: 22). This has led to a huge increase 
in shipyard activity. In 2000, there were 1900 workers related to the industry. In 2010, the 
number of workers had increased to 80.000 (Sinaval 2010: 7). The large and swift growth of 
the shipyard industry has not taken place without problems. One of the main problems is the 
lack of qualified workers, even though both Prominp and the shipyards themselves offer 
training programs (Piquet and Terra 2011: 38). 
 
Prominp has been involved with the vocational training system providing the industry with 
skilled workers since its establishment, and instigated a program called the National Plan of 
Workers’ Qualifications12 in 2006, sponsored by Petrobras. Between 2006 and 2013, this 
program qualified more than 97.000 workers, from basic educational levels up to university 
level (Rappel 2011: 70; Prominp 2015). Prominp defines the vocational training as one of the 
key issues for the further development of the oil industry, and cooperates with companies in 
the industry to promote this type of education. The candidates for the Prominp educational 
program are selected through competitive examinations. The training is done in collaboration 
with a range of institutions, from public universities to Senai (Almeida et.al 2014: 19). Senai 
offers technical education courses on various levels, ranging from high school to post-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Plano	  Nacional	  de	  Qualificação Profissional. 	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graduates, and is today the largest unit for vocational training in Latin America. More than 
2.3 million workers are qualified through this program each year (Senai 2014).  ANP is also 
engaged in vocational training, and has its own human resources program where they educate 
skilled workers who can attend to the needs of the oil industry. The education level range 
from technicians to post-graduates from universities. ANP has signed partnerships with 
several teaching institutions in order to promote education and research applied to the oil 
industry. The selected students receive a scholarship from ANP, and in the period between 
1999 and 2009, 5,121 such scholarships were awarded in 44 different courses and 31 
different institutions in 16 different states (Xavier 2012: 27; Rappel 2011: 69). The creation 
of Prominp represented a shift in the educational strategy of Brazil and Petrobras. Up until 
that point, Petrobras had been focusing on educating workers on university level, such as 
engineers and geologists. The demand for technicians and other vocationally trained workers 
had to a certain degree been ignored, but Lula’s ambitions of revitalizing the national 
industry induced their commitment to increasing the number of qualified workers. Prominp 
thus represented a step towards boosting the general level of human capital.  
 
Lula’s industrial project coincided with an overall growth in the Brazilian economy, ignited 
by high commodity prices and optimistic times in the oil sector. Brazil announced that they 
had reached energy self-sufficiency on April 21 2006, and in 2007 Petrobras revealed the 
discovery of the Pre-Salt reserves off the southeast coast. This discovery made Brazil one of 
the countries with the highest estimated petroleum reserves (Roett 2011: 120; Schutte 2013: 
50). The huge oil fields with high probability of finding economically viable deposits of oil, 
combined with the high international oil prices made the government rethink their oil 
strategy. The concession rounds were suspended the same year, and the role of Petrobras was 
strengthened when the firm became the sole operator of the Pre-Salt field (Schutte 2013: 58). 
The oil boom created a state of euphoria where many companies wanted to participate and 
the industry grew a lot in just a few years, with many newly established companies. The oil 
boom combined with the revitalization of the surrounding industries has led to a huge 
demand for skilled workers in Brazil. The Brazilian government and other institutions related 
to the oil industry have tried to meet this demand by increasing the number of students, but 
have not succeeded. A study from 2001 predicted that the oil industry would demand at least 
5.000 new skilled workers each year, about half of them being university graduates. The 
study also indicated that the Brazilian education system was not equipped to meet this 
demand, and that the state would need a coordinated plan of action. This has however not 
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been implemented to its full potential (Rappel 2011: 69). The Pre-Salt discoveries and the 
following euphoria put more pressure on the already increasing demand for labor, and the 
labor market was not able to provide the sufficient amount of qualified workers.  
 
4.4  Local content policies 
 
The local content requirements were implemented along with the concession rounds in 1997, 
where the intention was to maintain a strong national industry that would produce equipment 
for the oil industry even after Petrobras had lost its monopoly. In the first four rounds, there 
were no fixed demands on local content, and the definition of LC was any goods or services 
coming from a Brazilian supplier (Guimarães 2012: 8). From the fifth concession round in 
2003, the local content requirements (LCR) became more formal, and the oil industry 
suppliers had to comply with a certain share of LC in their deliveries. The ANP sets a LCR 
goal for each concession round (normally around 60-70 %), and the oil company that wins 
the auction has to secure that these requirements are met in their project. The oil companies 
then allocates LCR to the companies in the supply chain. The LC percentage varies between 
different companies, based on which services they provide. Some goods can be produced 
entirely in Brazil with Brazilian raw materials, and can be labeled as 100 % Brazilian, while 
other products need to be imported. The companies need to balance these products and have 
an end result that matches the LCR imposed on them. The LCR became harder to comply 
with after the seventh concession round in 2005, when the ANP implemented a compulsory 
and externally audited certification process. This new requirement has introduced higher 
costs - both economically and in time consumption - and led to more bottlenecks in the 
system (Almeida et.al 2014: 21; Guimarães 2013: 335). 
 
The purpose of the local content policy is to secure a continued use of the Brazilian supply-
chain even if international oil companies should become the dominant oil field operators. A 
long-term aim was to develop new technology-intensive sectors that would benefit the 
country in the future (Guimarães 2013: 336). One of the measures to secure this development 
was the implementation of the 1 % clause, which states that 1 % of the gross revenues from 
large oil production fields should be invested in research and development (ANP 2013). 
Another objective of implementing a local content policy is to avoid the resource curse, 
which is a situation where the national economy is dependent on one type of industry or 
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natural resource. One way to avoid this is to activate the supply chain of the oil sector, and 
thus promoting other industrial sectors besides the oil industry. If this strategy is fruitful, the 
economy will not be completely reliant on the international commodity prices. Another 
strategy to avoid the resource curse is to make investments in research and development in 
order to develop more technological demanding industries that are able to compete 
internationally (Xavier 2012: 12). The development of the Norwegian oil industry is often 
highlighted as an inspiration for Brazil. However, Eduardo Guimarães claims that the 
Brazilian authorities have constructed a disadvantage for themselves in demanding a 
minimum percentage of local content in every contract and operation in the Brazilian oil 
industry. This provides a protected environment for the Brazilian oil service companies, as it 
shelters them from competition from foreign actors. This situation will often create a loss of 
efficiency. His solution is to look to Norway, where local content is not required but rather 
rewarded: the companies with the highest level of local content are favored when the 
government hand out concessions (2013: 337-339).  Another objection towards the local 
content regime is that it lacks a coordinated method of diffusing information about the 
various practices and ways to comply with local content requirements, and there is little 
transparency in the information that is made public. Every institution spreads its own 
information material, which can sometimes lead to misinformation, or cross-information. The 
lack of coordinated information makes it harder for the companies to comply with the local 
content requirements (Xavier 2012: 22). 
 
 
4.5  The end of the oil boom? 
 
The optimism of the early 2000’s has diminished in the last couple of years. Several factors 
can explain this decline. One of them is the decrease of the Brazilian economic growth, 
where the whole economy has stagnated since 2010, compared to the relatively high growth 
in the previous years (ECLAC 2015). Another factor is the declining international oil prices, 
which diminishes the economic surplus of costly offshore oil extraction. But the most 
important factor is arguably the corruption scandal now occurring in Petrobras. News of the 
scandal reached the surface in March 2014, when a former director of Petrobras was arrested. 
The investigations are ongoing, and involve both Petrobras executives and high-ranking 
politicians. The corruption scandal has led to a halt in further oil sector investments, 
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Petrobras has announced that they will cut about 30 % of their planned investments for 2015 
(Estadão 2015; Folha de São Paulo 2014). The situation in Petrobras is affecting the whole 
industry, and many suppliers have seen their contracts with Petrobras postponed or cancelled.  
 
A concluding remark about the oil and gas industry is that the most discernable aspect about 
is perhaps the national oil company, Petrobras, which has dominated the sector since its 
establishment. Another factor worth noticing is the steady development of technology and 
human capital following the offshore exploration in increasingly deeper waters. The 
government’s intention was to continue this balanced development after the implementation 
of the local content policy, by creating Prominp and thus attend to the increased demand of 
vocationally trained workers. But the oil boom starting three years later disrupted the already 
weak balance between supply and demand of work force, and led to chaotic tendencies and a 
race between the companies to obtain enough qualified workers. It is safe to assume that the 
dynamics in the industry have changed over the last ten years and moved away from low-skill 
equilibrium dynamics? Or is it still possible to recognize mechanisms from HMEs? In the 
next chapter, I will address this question, using an MNC firm’s-eye view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   31	  
5 The labor market in the Brazilian oil 
industry  
 
In the final part of the theory chapter, I described the most central characteristics of the low-
skill equilibrium, as presented by Ben Ross Schneider. I will now explore whether the same 
characteristics can be found in the Brazilian oil sector. My hypothesis is that the special 
position of Petrobras and the Brazilian oil industry in Brazil’s industrial policy both make the 
oil and gas sector deviate from the traditional conception of HMEs. One aspect of this 
particular industrial policy is the local content policy, in which one of the central arguments 
is that goods and services should be provided locally to improve the capabilities of the supply 
chain and surrounding industries. One of the intentions behind producing goods locally and 
using the Brazilian labor force is to gradually increase the level of human capital. LC policies 
can put restrictions on the MNCs as to how much equipment and how many workers they can 
import from their home country or a third country. The limited opportunity to obtain skilled 
workers elsewhere will eventually put more pressure on the Brazilian labor market to supply 
such workers, and will possibly produce different dynamics than are typically found in a low-
skill equilibrium.  
 
The skilled labor force needed in the Brazilian oil industry can be divided into three groups 
based on the type of education, as seen in table 1. This distinction is not absolute, and there 
are possibly many examples in which it is not valid. It has however been fruitful for this 
analysis. 
 
Table 1: types of work force in the 
Brazilian oil and gas industry 
Technicians, blue-collar workers Graduates from technical schools, 
vocationally trained. 
White-collar workers Graduates from universities or similar 
types of higher education 
Cadets and naval officers Graduates from the two naval academies, 
Ciaga and Ciaba. 
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The first distinction is between technicians with secondary education and specialized 
training, and university-trained workers such as engineers and geologists (Schneider 2013: 
114). These two groups are often referred to as blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. 
The third group includes graduates from the naval academies, who are mainly found in the 
maritime industry and the offshore supply segment of the oil industry. These three types of 
work force will be discussed separately where this is possible, as the supply-demand 
mechanisms in each of them can differ between the types.   
 
5.1 Low-skill equilibrium in the oil and gas industry? 
 
In this section I will analyze the Brazilian labor market based on the three low-skill 
equilibrium mechanisms I presented in chapter three. These mechanisms feed back on one 
another, and are also described as negative complementarities. First, I will examine to what 
extent each of them are present in the Brazilian oil industry, before I discuss whether the 
Brazilian oil industry reflects a typical HME in regard to the low-skill equilibrium.  
 
1. The educational system does not provide enough skilled workers, and this is 
encouraging the MNCs to invest in lower-technology production. 
 
The liberalization of the industry, followed by the oil boom made Brazil an attractive 
investment area for foreign companies, and a huge number of MNCs have started operations 
there during the 2000’s. The increasing number of active firms has created a large demand 
for skilled workers on various levels. Even though the Brazilian population is relatively well 
educated, they have not been prepared to meet this demand. The previous chapter showed 
that there was a foundation of highly skilled workers in the Brazilian oil industry prior to the 
oil boom, due to Petrobras’ efforts in educating engineers and geologists. Petrobras’ training 
system was however primarily based on white-collar workers. Nonetheless, these workers 
have been highly demanded. Geologists were highlighted as particularly sought after 
(Inventure Management)13. The educational foundation in regard to technical schools has not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The information in this chapter is based on the interviews (see appendix A for a full list of respondents), and 
references to company names without indicating the year means that I refer to the interview. I have chosen to 
not refer to the actual companies when I account for general opinions framed by more than three companies in 
order to maintain a certain flow in the text. These references are written as ”some companies” or ”nearly all 
companies”. 
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been strong enough to cater to the blue-collar demands from a growing oil industry, despite 
the efforts to increase student numbers from programs like Prominp. The lack of qualified 
workers can be seen as a reflection and an effect of the Brazilian education system, which has 
been described as “poor” and “lacking” in several interviews14. The work type with the 
highest shortage of skilled workers is arguably the cadets and naval officers. The need for 
both white-collar and blue-collar workers must be regarded for Brazil as a national economy, 
in which workers such as engineers, technicians and electricians can be imported to the oil 
industry from other national industries (Innovation Norway). This option is however not 
applicable to the maritime graduates, as they belong to a shielded education only provided by 
the Navy, and cannot be assigned from other industrial segments.  
 
Lack of skilled workers has however not prevented MNCs from making investments in the 
Brazilian oil industry. Norwegian oil service companies have experience and competence 
from operating in the Norwegian offshore industry, and see the Brazilian offshore market as a 
natural expansion area. But the Brazilian expansion has not been smooth and effortless. All 
of the firms interviewed report problems regarding the previously mentioned lack of skilled 
workers. However, the problems with finding skilled workers has not encouraged MNCs to 
shift their investments on to lower-technology production, the nature of the oil and gas 
industry probably can account for. Offshore oil extraction demands equipment of high 
quality, provided by workers with university education or technicians who have undergone 
vocational training programs, and can thus be labeled a higher-technology industry even 
though much of the R&D should be developed outside of Brazil. The companies with a large 
blue-collar work force provide their own training programs for new workers to make up for 
the lack of skills and to prepare them for their production tasks. The duration of these 
programs last from a few weeks for the most basic tasks, and up to two or more years for the 
most technologically demanding responsibilities (Aker and Vard). 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The public universities in Brazil are quite good, but almost impossible to access if the student in question has 
a public school background. It is paradoxical that the majority of students accepted to public universities are 
from private high schools, while the students who have been attending public high schools have few chances of 
continuing their public and less expensive education. The educational system contributes a great deal to the 
maintenance of the hierarchical and unequal societal structures. 	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2. The atomized labor relations and high turnover among workers prevent investments 
in training. 
 
High turnover rates are a problem in the Brazilian oil industry, and the phenomenon exists 
within all of the three work types mentioned earlier. Nearly every company I interviewed 
reported having troubles with employees leaving them after only six to twelve months. Most 
of the respondents explained the high turnover rates with  Brazilian workers being more 
“short-sighted” and opportunistic than what the companies are used to from other countries. 
The Brazilians want to be promoted faster, and often ask for a higher wage than what can be 
assumed to be normal15. They want to rise rapidly in the career ladder, and are willing to go 
to another company if they are offered 200-300 BRL16 more per month, or a more important 
job title. The high turnover rate is often described as an effect of the tough labor market 
caused by the oil boom. There is an overall lack of qualified workers, which implies that the 
demand is much higher than the supply of work force. This inequality in the labor market 
provides the qualified workers with a lot of power, and they can dictate their own terms. 
Should a worker choose to leave his current position, he would have no problems finding 
another job. This way, one can say that the atomized labor relations have favored the workers 
during the oil boom, since they easily can move on to better or more important jobs. 
 
The companies are very much aware of this situation. The high turnover rate is a difficult 
issue, because it creates a lot of insecurity both within and among the companies. Within the 
companies, the administration can be unsure about how many resources they should invest in 
courses and training for the workers since this will make the workers more attractive on the 
labor market, which increases the risk of them leaving the company. The high demand for 
skilled workers creates insecurity and more competition between the companies, as they are 
not only competing for projects and contracts, but also for the workers’ favor. The high 
competition level has also led to increased numbers of poaching. Multiple MNCs stated that 
they have staff retaining practices in order to keep their workers satisfied and to keep them 
from wanting to leave the firm. Some representatives highlighted good benefit programs for 
their workers, which can include health care, private schooling for their children and legal 
assistance among other things. Some respondents also talked about the importance of creating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 One company even told me about a Brazilian engineer asking for a salary that was higher than the salary of 
their executive manager in Norway. 
16 100 BRL equals approximately 260 NOK (29.04.15).	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a company culture where the employees felt that they belonged and were included. The 
Brazilian employees seem to enjoy working in a “Norwegian work environment” with a 
flatter and less hierarchical structure, shorter distances up to the manager, and more freedom 
in the way they handle their work tasks. This has however not prevented the turnover 
completely. 
 
Problems regarding high turnover are a trait that the oil industry share with the HME 
typology. Nevertheless, the high turnover is arguably caused by two different chains of 
events. The atomized labor relations in HMEs, together with the general low skill levels, 
make the workers easily replaceable and render them with little power against their 
employers. In addition, the labor market regulations do not offer the workers adequate 
protection (Schneider 2013: 106). This leads to a labor market where the firms are in control 
and can ‘shop around’ for new employees if they are not satisfied with their current workers. 
The situation in the Brazilian oil industry stands in contrast to HMEs considering who has 
more power. The oil industry’s labor market is decisively more a market for the workers. 
Here, the workers ‘shop around’ for new positions if they are not happy with their current 
workplace, causing high turnover rates. An interesting observation is that while both theory 
and reality show high turnover, this phenomenon comes from two quite different places. 
Hence it is hard to conclude that the Brazilian oil industry displays the same symptom as the 
low-skill equilibrium, even though the effect is similar. 
 
3. The MNCs have few incentives to hire highly skilled workers locally, or invest in 
training and education. 
 
This is perhaps where the Brazilian oil industry deviates the most from the HME 
characteristics. The general impression of the oil industry is that MNCs operating in Brazil 
are interested in hiring skilled workers locally. One of the main reasons for hiring locally is 
the extra advantage of obtaining local knowledge on how the mechanisms of the market 
work. It would take a lot of extra effort for foreigners to acquire the same knowledge. The 
Brazilian staff has another advantage with already speaking the local language, Portuguese. 
Another highlighted reason for hiring locally was the costs of bringing expats to Brazil. An 
estimation of the annual cost of an expat is normally between 2 and 4 million NOK per 
worker (Inventure Management 2013: 41). As a result, nearly all of the firms I interviewed 
have at least 80% Brazilian staff. Some of the firms I interviewed manage with one or two 
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Norwegian expats. It also appears that the process of obtaining a work visa in Brazil is long 
and complicated. Avoiding the extra workload of the visa applying process can also be an 
important factor as to why the MNCs prefer Brazilian workers. At the end of the visa 
applying process, it is not given that the visas will be approved, which leads to a lot of 
frustration among the MNCs. Some respondents said that their firm could only get visas for a 
certain percentage of workers, but this visa restriction does not seem to be a direct part of the 
LC policy. In theory, the LC policy can prevent the importation of a large number of workers, 
since the final product that the firm provides needs to have a certain percentage of LC, and 
the labor used to create this product is included as LC. But if the firms want to hire a small 
number of foreign workers that does not necessarily affect the LC share, the visa regulations 
seem to be the real obstacle. Many of the companies also mentioned that there is not that 
much structure and regularity in the visa process, which makes the outcome less predictable. 
Most firms use headhunter agencies when looking for new workers. Many of the firms 
employing white-collar workers said they preferred to hire their workers straight from 
university. This way they can form the work mentalities to be more “Norwegian”. Other 
reasons are that newly graduated workers are cheaper in terms of salary, and convenience: It 
has been nearly impossible to get hold of skilled and experienced workers in the heated labor 
market during the oil boom. 
 
Some of the companies in need of white-collar workers have collaborations with universities 
in order to attract newly graduated employees. The firms seeking blue-collar workers are 
often collaborating with technical schools and can offer trainee programs and apprenticeships 
(Aker). Jovem Aprendiz17 is an example of such a program. Here, the companies are obliged 
to take on apprentices (Farstad). The maritime companies in need of naval officers expressed 
the necessity of working together with Ciaga in Rio, as it is one of only two naval academies 
in Brazil. The labor market during the oil boom, up until 2014, was very tough for most of 
the companies to whom I spoke. The solution has been to employ nearly qualified workers, 
and newly educated workers, or bring in foreigners if it is worth the effort to undergo the visa 
process. 
 
Another illustration of the differences between HME theory and the Brazilian reality is the 
cooperation between Norwegian firms and organizations with the aim of improving the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Translates to Young Apprentice. 
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operational conditions in Brazil. Team Norway18 lobbies the Brazilian authorities to increase 
the number of students with vocational training, among other things (Innovation Norway; 
Norwegian General Consulate). This example is not expected according to HME theory, 
where one assumes that the MNCs would rather concentrate on trying to avoid the local 
content policies, and not be interested in promoting education and increased human capital 
(Schneider 2013: 34). Another example of such cooperation between companies is 
Associação Brasileira dos Armadores Noruegueses (Abran), an organization established by 
Norwegian ship-owner companies operating in Brazil that have ties to the Norwegian 
Shipowner Association. Since its establishment in 2013, the organization has been working 
on influencing the naval authorities to increase the number of students at the two naval 
academies in order to attend to the high demand for labor. The number of graduates has 
augmented from ninety graduating cadets in 2000 to almost one thousand cadets in 2012 
(Abran).  
Some of the Norwegian companies have started an NGO called Dream Learn Work, 
encouraged by Norwegian minister of international development, Erik Solheim, in 2006. The 
idea was to target the youth in the poorer neighborhoods of Rio, and help them get into 
vocational training programs offered by Senai. This way, the companies also help themselves 
by increasing access to skilled workers, while at the same time conducting corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) programs (Dream Learn Work). These three examples are all interesting 
cases that deviate from the general expectations of the HME typology. However, it is not 
certain that they are traits of the Brazilian oil and gas industry; they might just be results of a 
Norwegian ‘culture’ or mindset.  
 
Low-skill equilibrium?  
 
Based on the three characteristics just discussed, it is possible to argue that the low-skill 
equilibrium does not exist to its full extent in the Brazilian oil industry. It is difficult to locate 
the equilibrium in the labor market, as the market tendency leans towards an unstable and 
more dynamic situation. The equilibrium between supply and demand of labor force has been 
non-existent during the peak years from 2003 up to the end of 2013, as the demand for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Team Norway is a term used by Norwegian embassies and other institutions in the Foreign Service around 
the world. In Brazil Team Norway includes the following institutions and organizations: The Norwegian 
embassy in Brasilia, the General Consulate in Rio, Innovation Norway, Norwegian-Brazilian Chamber of 
Commerce, Abran/The Norwegian Shipowner Association, Intsok, Norwegian Seafood Council and 
Sjømannskirken (Norwegian Church Abroad).  
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workers increased out of proportions and made it an impossible task to secure a sufficient 
labor supply in all three work types. The massive demand for qualified labor gave workers 
the necessary incentives to invest in education and vocational training since the right kind of 
education would have guaranteed them a well-paid job. The MNCs have incentives to escape 
the low-skill equilibrium as well, since a well-educated work force is in their best interest. A 
good educational foundation in the labor market helps MNCs to avoid spending a lot of time 
and economic resources on training their employees on general skills in addition to the firm-
specific skills. Finding qualified Brazilian workers is also more cost effective than bringing 
foreign work force, given the extra costs of the immigration bureaucracy.  
 
With these incentives to invest in human capital from both parties, it would appear that the 
low-skill equilibrium should be on its way to oblivion. But the incentives are not the only 
prerequisite of breaking free from the vicious circle. Even though the low-skill equilibrium is 
not fully present in the Brazilian oil industry, there is still an issue with low skills. The 
Brazilian educational system is halting and can be characterized as a contributing factor to 
maintaining social inequalities. The poor quality of education can also have an effect on 
students’ incentives to undertake higher education or vocational training, as they are not fully 
informed about what kind of opportunities they are offered after finishing high school. One 
example of this lack of knowledge is shown when students fail to fill up vacancies in free 
courses of vocational training that are sometimes offered (Dream Learn Work). This last part 
shows that even though the Brazilian oil industry is in the process of escaping the low-skill 
equilibrium, there are still many issues that need to be solved before the industry could 
eventually settle on a higher-skilled equilibrium in the labor market. 
 
To sum up, it appears that all the Norwegian MNCs I interviewed have strong incentives to 
hire locally and to invest in increased human capital among their work force. These 
incentives can be defined as voluntary or mandatory. The voluntary incentives are the 
benefits of hiring locally such as knowledge of the local market and avoiding expat costs. 
The mandatory incentives derive from the bureaucracy of obtaining workers permits and 
visas, as well as complying with the LCR, and can be seen as incentives forced upon the 
companies. These incentives constitute the factor that deviates the most from HME typology, 
and can play a very important part in further developing the industry’s human capital and 
hence escape the low-skill equilibrium. Another distinguishing difference is the mechanisms 
behind the high turnover rates. Even though the result is similar to HMEs, the causing factors 
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are quite different. The only characteristic that is in line with expectation from HME theory is 
the continuingly poor educational foundation that would normally create hindrances for 
breaking free from the low-skill equilibrium.  
 
5.2 The effects of local content policies 
 
In the previous section I argued that the MNC incentives of increasing the human capital 
make the Brazilian oil industry deviate from HME typology. This section will be dedicated to 
the question of whether this deviation can be seen as a consequence of the local content 
policy that the Brazilian authorities have championed. Part of the intention behind the LC 
policy was to boost the human capital in the country by making the oil companies and the 
supply chain employ a larger share of Brazilian work force. This use of the Brazilian work 
force was supposed to lead to the industry breaking free from the low-skill equilibrium. The 
LC policy would create a greater incentive to invest in education and training by requiring 
that a certain percentage of the final company product should be of Brazilian origin. The 
labor is included in the definition of “Brazilian origin”, and this inclusion created a need for 
Brazilian workers in many companies, especially among the ones who relied on importing 
goods and thus would use the work force to increase the Brazilian percentage. 
 
However, the policy itself cannot manage to increase the level of human capital in the 
industry; it is also necessary to strengthen the educational system, both on university level 
and opportunities for vocational training. Here, Brazilian authorities have arguably failed to 
cater to the demand for skilled labor. Even though the number of workers pertaining to the oil 
industry and its supply chains has increased radically over the last years, the number of 
students in the industry has not followed this growth. The gap between supply and demand 
has been filled by nearly or non-qualified workers that have been trained by their respective 
companies before starting to work. This would normally be an adequate solution to the skills 
problem, but the high turnover in the Brazilian labor market has caused the firms to dread 
extensive training courses since they could potentially waste a lot of resources on workers 
who would leave them after a short period of time.  
 
The LC policy does not appear to have been regarded as an incentive to increase human 
capital among the firms I interviewed. The majority of the respondents claimed that they 
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would not have changed a lot in their labor force strategies since they would have strived to 
acquire Brazilian workers anyway. The companies who expressed concerns about LCR 
affecting their work force were the offshore supply representatives, in other words the 
maritime companies that require graduates from the naval academies. This can be seen as a 
consequence of a rather unbalanced approach to increase student numbers. Technical 
education and vocational training programs have received a lot of attention and support 
through programs like Prominp and Senai. The commercial naval education has on the other 
hand remained under the control of the Navy, with only two academies in the whole country, 
although with an increase in the number of students since 2000 (Abran). The result is that the 
requirements of LC19 in the maritime segment has led to an enormous demand for Brazilian 
seafarers and a huge wage increase, which has made the whole segment more costly. The 
high wages make the industry less cost efficient, which makes it difficult to compete outside 
the Brazilian sphere (Farstad). Labor shortage can also potentially be a threat to security 
onboard the vessels as well, if the graduated cadets are promoted to officer rank too soon. 
The captain and the first officer onboard should have at least ten years of experience, but it is 
difficult to find adequately experienced staff in the heated labor market. A last resort to this 
problem is to promote less experienced officers who might not be capable of managing the 
responsibility. Unlike maritime companies, other firms with white-collar or blue-collar 
workers in their staff do not portray the local content requirements as the cause of the heated 
labor market since they would have preferred to hire Brazilian workers anyway. Rather, they 
name other areas where the LC policy was causing problems, such as strict rules regarding 
the certification process of LCR and the fact that these rules are changed too often. Another 
problem concerning the LC policy is unclear communication from the authorities, which can 
lead to different interpretations among the companies as to which regulations to follow 
(DNVGL). This difference in opinion between maritime companies in need of marine staff 
and the other companies can, as previously mentioned, derive from the fact that the land-
based companies can search for workers in other Brazilian industries, and attract these 
workers with higher salaries. 
 
When measuring the LC policy’s accomplishment in raising the level of human capital, one 
should also take into account the timing and the context. President Lula’s increased focus on 
improving the national industry through programs like Prominp was put in motion in a very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The local content requirement for offshore labor force at the time of my fieldwork (February 2015) was that 
2/3 of the naval crewmembers should be Brazilian after the first operational year (Abran). 
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optimistic time for the oil industry. The international oil price was steadily increasing, and by 
Lula’s second presidential period, the discovery of the Pre-Salt field was made public. 
Naturally, this increased the foreign interest of investing in the Brazilian oil and gas, and the 
industry grew rapidly. One can almost say that it grew too fast for the infrastructure to 
follow. The commitment to increasing human capital fell behind the economic growth, and 
the training programs already put in motion were not sufficiently prepared to attend to the 
increased demand for skilled workers. 
 
In an attempt to sum up the LC’s effect on the labor market, one can argue that the LC has 
indeed helped increase the Brazilian human capital related to the oil industry. Many actors 
have benefitted from the commitment to producing goods and services locally, both within 
the industry and its supply chains, and in other industries. In this way, the LC can be labeled 
as a tool in the continued development of the nation. However, LC policies have also made 
the oil industry less efficient end competitive. The suppliers compete for contracts by 
delivering the best and most cost effective offers. Many companies have stated that these 
offers would have been more effective if they were allowed to import parts needed for the 
production, instead of producing it in Brazil. In this regard, every level of the supply chain 
will be more costly than it would have been without LC. The MNCs themselves do not loose 
revenue, as they add these extra costs into their offer. It is Petrobras, and eventually Brazil as 
a nation that pays for this reduced efficiency. This can however be a small price to pay for the 
long-term goal of developing the nation’s human capital and escape the low-skill equilibrium. 
 
5.3 Objections towards the hierarchical market economy 
 
The varieties of capitalism framework in general promotes a stable market environment, with 
positive or negative complementarities that feed back on each other and thus strengthen the 
existing institutions. The labor market in the Brazilian oil industry is however an 
environment that has evolved and changed a lot so far in the 2000’s.  In this sense, one can 
argue that the case of the oil sector is supporting Jackson and Deeg’s suggestions that it is 
possible to change certain institutions without changing the overall framework. Every market 
or economy has its own traits and dynamics, which can be the subjects of change if the actors 
within the economy are not satisfied. The oil and gas industry is arguably at the same time 
	  42	  
bringing new dynamics in to the Brazilian national economy, but this would be need to be the 
subject for a more extensive case study. 
 
The case of the Brazilian oil industry can also be used to support Colin Crouch’s objections 
towards the rigidness of the typologies. Crouch claims that instead of one typology being 
pushed to fit a whole economy, it is possible that one economy can fit more than one 
typology. This analysis of the oil sector can to some extent support this claim, with traces of 
LMEs, such as extended poaching of workers and the worker individuality. The Norwegian 
MNCs coordination and cooperation can resemble the networks of a CME. One conclusion 
from this case study is that the Brazilian oil and gas industry certainly is not an ideal case of 
HME typology, but without discarding the HME completely. Researchers wanting more 
theoretical details will often criticize parsimonious typologies. If the typologies however 
become too detail oriented, they will loose their ability to generalize and group subjects 
together. Following this debate, this master thesis can be seen as an attempt to enrich, and 
make exceptions to, the HME, but without questioning its existence. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The Brazilian oil industry arguably deviates from a typical HME by not having an extended 
low-skill equilibrium in its labor market. The low-skill equilibrium mechanism regarding 
MNCs’ lack of incentives to invest in training is absent in this case study. An unexpected 
observation was also made: not only are the Norwegian MNCs interested in hiring Brazilian 
skilled work force, they are also cooperating and coordinating among themselves in order to 
induce the Brazilian authorities to promote education and vocational training. Based on HME 
predictions, this is a surprising dynamic. The cause of high turnover rates is another alteration 
from low-skill equilibrium mechanisms. In theory, the high turnover would be caused by a 
fragmented and lowly skilled work force with few legal rights and powerful firms who would 
frequently change their staff. In this case study, one could almost say that it is the other way 
around. The high demand for labor has transferred the market power to the workers, who can 
choose between many job offers and will change jobs if they are not satisfied. The Brazilian 
oil industry still struggles with one low-skill equilibrium characteristic, which is the poor 
educational foundation. This can however be seen as a national issue, and not just related to 
the oil industry. 
 
One conclusion is therefore that the dynamics of the Brazilian oil industry is quite different 
from HME theory, including the partial absent of the low-skill equilibrium. It is however not 
possible to claim that these differences are caused by local content policies alone, based on 
this case study. Some of the maritime companies interviewed named LCR as a cause of the 
heated labor market, but the majority of firm did not place such opinions. This does not 
necessarily mean that the LCR have no effect on the labor market, but rather that the causal 
connection is more implicit. The level of LCR impact on the low-skill equilibrium thus 
remains inconclusive. 
 
The situation today is however different from the situation described throughout this case 
study. As a consequence of the Petrobras scandal, several contracts have been cancelled or 
put on hold. Many workers have lost their jobs and are now available in the market. This 
means that the supply and demand of labor force is relatively equal, with some exceptions. 
Workers do not have the same power as during the oil boom years, and one outcome is that it 
will be harder for the workers to change jobs as often as they have done in the past, as they 
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can now risk to end up without a job. Many respondents predicted that the labor market 
would be more “stable and balanced” from now on. If the labor market finds an equilibrium 
in the future, it is very likely that it will be higher skilled than the one described in HME 
theory. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix A: List of companies and organizations 
interviewed: 
 
 
 
Company name: Place of interview: 
ABRAN Rio de Janeiro 
Axess (2 respondents) 1 in Rio de Janeiro, 1 via Skype 
Deep Ocean  Via Skype 
DNVGL Rio de Janeiro 
Dream Learn Work Rio de Janeiro 
Farstad (2 repondents) Rio de Janeiro 
Harding Rio de Janeiro 
Innovation Norway Rio de Janeiro 
Intsok Oslo 
Inventure Management Rio de Janeiro 
KNOT (Knutsen Offshore) Rio de Janeiro 
Kongsberg Maritime20 Oslo 
The Norwegian General Consulate in Rio 
de Janeiro 
Rio de Janeiro 
Southern Marine Rio de Janeiro 
Statoil Rio de Janeiro 
Vard Via Skype 
 
I have also had access to the recordings of an interview with Aker Solutions, conducted by 
my supervisor Yuri Kasahara.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The Kongsberg representative is no longer working in the company. 
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Appendix B: Interview guide 
 
 
 
 
1. How long have your firm been operating in the Brazilian oil industry? 
 
2. How many people does your firm employ? And how many of them are Brazilian? 
 
3. What kind of educational background do the workers have? 
 
4. What is your main strategy/practice when hiring workers? 
 
5. Do you collaborate with any Brazilian institutions when searching for skilled workers, 
and if so, in what way? 
 
6. How will you describe the labor market?  
 
- Is it easy to find skilled workers?  
- Any particular obstacles? 
 
 
7. Has this situation changed in the last few years? 
 
- Easier or more difficult to find qualified workers? 
 
 
8. In your opinion, have the local content requirements changed the Brazilian labor 
market in any way? If so, how? 
 
 
9. If the LC requirement did not exist, would your employment strategy be the same? If 
no, what would have changed? 
 
10. Any other factors relevant to this topic? 
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Appendix C: Letter to participants 
Participation in a research project about Norwegian firms operating in the 
Brazilian oil/gas and maritime industry and their strategies in acquiring 
skilled workers 
 
 
Research purpose 
 
This project is a master’s thesis written at the institute of political science at the University of 
Oslo, in collaboration with the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research 
(NIBR). The thesis’ aim is to study the strategies of Norwegian firms operating in the 
Brazilian oil industry as to how they acquire skilled workers to their companies. 
In order to do so, the study is dependent on the participation of representatives from these 
firms, and we would appreciate your participation. 
 
Practical information 
 
The information gathering will consist of personal interviews conducted in Rio de Janeiro in 
the period between the 25th of February and the 13th of March.  
 
The interviews will be recorded, and all personal information will be treated confidentially. 
The only people with access to the data are the master student and the supervisor. 
 
The master’s thesis will be handed in by the end of May 2015, and the recordings will be 
made anonymous afterwards. 
 
The participation in this project is voluntary, and it is possible to withdraw your consent at 
any time during the project without any specific reason. 
 
The project is registered with the Data Protection Official for Research at the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services (NSD). 
 
If you have any questions, please contact  
Maria Melby, master student, at mariamelby0@gmail.com or 
Yuri Kasahara, supervisor, at yuri.kasahara@nibr.no   
 
 
 
 
I have read the project information, and I hereby consent to participate in a personal 
interview on behalf of my firm. 
 
 
……………………………………………………….……………………………. 
  (Date)               (Signed by participant)       
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